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CHAPTER 16 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE and EUGENE LYNE 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§16.1. Rate regulation: Deviation filing. In Liberty Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance,! the petitioner sought a 
review of the order of the Commissioner of Insurance denying its ap-
plication for permission to file, under the provisions of the Fire, Ma-
rine and Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Law,2 a deviation from the 
filings for windstorm and hail insurance on dwellings made on behalf 
of its members and subscribers by the New England Fire Insurance 
Rating Association. This coverage, which is customarily afforded as 
part of the so-called "extended coverage," is subject under the filings 
of the rating association to a mandatory $50 deductible. Liberty had 
sought unsuccessfully to persuade the rating association to file a $100 
deductible windstorm and hail coverage for dwellings, as an optional 
alternative to the $50 deductible coverage, which would be written at a 
substantially reduced premium. Its application to file the optional 
coverage on its own behalf was rejected by the commissioner on the 
ground that the proposal was not properly a "deviation" within the 
meaning of the rate regulatory law.3 
The case appears to be one of first impression in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere under statutes that are based upon the "all-industry" fire, 
marine, and inland marine rate regulatory bill, which was developed by 
the joint conference of the All-Industry Committee and the Subcom-
mittee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on 
Rates and Rating Organizations, following the decision of the United 
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§16.1. 1340 Mass. 413,164 N.E.2d 908 (1960). 
2 G.L., c. 174A, added by Acts of 1947. c. 614. effective October 1. 1947. 
3 G.L.. c. 174A, §9. The material portion of Section 9 reads: "Every member of or 
subscriber to a rating organization shall adhere to the filings made on its behalf 
by such organization except that any such insurer may make written application to 
the commissioner for -permission to file a deviation from the class rates. schedules. 
rating plans or rules respecting any kind of insurance. or class of risk within a kind 
of insurance. or combination thereof." The word "deviation" in the statute is not 
defined. 
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States Supreme Court holding insurance to be commerce and within 
the scope of federal power when transacted across state lines4 and the 
enactment of the McCarron-Ferguson Act5 preserving to the states the 
regulation of insurance. The only case in Massachusetts involving the 
deviation section of the statute is Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Commissioner of Insurance,6 which held that a deviation must be from 
a rating rule or a rule affecting rates and that a proposal to make avail-
able a premium payment plan different from that filed by the rating 
association was not such a deviation. In the present case it was the 
position of the Commissioner of Insurance that the Liberty proposal 
could not be a deviation because it enlarged the provisions of the filing 
of the rating association without disturbing the original filing, thus 
providing the company, in substance, with two filings instead of one. 
Simultaneously with the enactment of the fire rating law the General 
Court enacted the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Law,7 likewise 
based upon the model casualty and surety rate regulatory bill developed 
by the All-Industry Committee. One fundamental difference between 
the fire rating law and the casualty rating law is the treatment of "de-
viations," 8 a difference that reflects the different methods of operation 
of the two kinds of insurance business. Under the casualty law, a de-
viation can be only a uniform percentage decrease or increase of the 
rate filed for all or a class of insured risks. The deviation provision of 
the fire rating law is not so limited; it permits a deviation from the filed 
class rates, schedules, rating plans, or rules for any kind of insurance 
or class of risk within a kind of insurance. With respect to deviations 
under the fire law there is no statutory requirement of a "uniform per-
centage modification"; neither is the permissible deviation limited to 
. rates, but broadly extends to rates, rating plans, and rules affecting 
rates. 
In the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, the word "deviation" 
in the fire rating law is synonymous with "variation." A filing that, 
as here, combined a reduction in the scope of coverage filed by the rat-
ing association and a reduction of the rate based upon the coverage 
4 United States v. South-eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 64 Sup. C,t. 
1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944). 
5 Pub. L. 15, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., c. 20, approved March 9, 1945, 59 Stat. 34, 15 
U.S.C. §§101l-IOI5 (1958). 
6327 Mass. 745, 747-750, 101 N.E.2d 335, 337-339 (1951). 
7 G.L., c. I75A, added by Acts of 1947, c. 641, effective October I, 1947. 
S G.L., c. I75A, §9. The material portion of Section 9 reads: "Every member of, 
or subscriber to, a rating organization shall adhere to the filings made on its behalf 
by such organization except that any such insurer may make written application to 
the commissioner for permission to file a uniform percentage decrease or increase 
to be applied to the premiums produced by the rating system so filed for a kind of 
insurance, or for a class of insurance which is found by the commissioner to be a 
proper rating unit for the application of such uniform percentage decrease or in-
crease, or for a subdivision of a kind of insurance (I) comprised of a group of 
manual classifications which is treated as a separate unit for rate making purposes, 
or (2) for which separate expense provisions are included in the filings of the rating 
organization." Compare G.L., c. 174A, §9, quoted in note 3 supra. 
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modification may properly be made under this statutory provision and 
should have been entertained by the Commissioner of Insurance. The 
filing in question is not any less permissible because it is an optional 
alternative coverage and premium rather than a substitute required 
to be used in all cases, because nothing in the statute precludes a de-
viation that is to be used optionally depending upon the coverage se-
lection made by the insured. 
§16.2. General liability insurance: Assault and battery. Bowen v. 
Lloyds Underwriters l was a bilI in equity to reach and apply the de-
fendant insurers' obligation under an owners', landlords', and tenants' 
public liability policy in satisfaction of judgments against the defend-
ant insured, and its employee, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff as 
a result of an assault committed by the employee. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court rejected the argument, in support of pleas in abatement, that 
the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained 
in G.L., c. 260, §4, pointing out that the one-year limitation specified 
in that section for suits by judgment creditors has application only to 
motor vehicle tort actions required to be secured by G.L., c. 90, and 
such actions against officers and employees of the Commonwealth. Re-
lying upon Sontag v. Galer,2 the Court sustained the defendant's de-
murrer, holding that bodily injuries caused by an assault and battery 
are not "accidental bodily injuries" within the meaning of the policy 
sued upon. It is the state of the will of the person by whose agency 
the injury was caused rather than that of the injured person that de-
termines whether an injury was accidental. The underlying principle 
of the Galer case is unaffected by the circumstance that the assault was 
committed by an agent of the defendant and not by the defendant. 
§16.3. Motor vehicle insurance: Release of liability. Joseph v. 
Tata l was an action by an automobile passenger for personal injuries 
sustained when the automobile in which she was riding was struck by 
an automobile operated by the defendant. The defendant's insurer 
interposed an affirmative defense of a written release and moved for a 
directed verdict, which the lower court denied. On appeal it was held 
that there was sufficient evidence to take to the jury the question as to 
whether the plaintiff had validly released her cause of action, since it 
could have been found that in procuring the execution of a general 
release the insurance company's adjuster had represented that the set-
tlement being negotiated related only to property damage and did not 
cover the plaintiff's personal injuries. Even though the release that the 
plaintiff signed was plainly a general release and the check endorsement 
was even more plainly a purported release of all claims, it was, in the 
judgment of the Court, fraudulently procured and, therefore, did not 
bar the plaintiff in her subsequent personal injury action. 
§16.4. Physical damage insurance: Malicious mischief and vandal-
ism. The Supreme Judicial Court held in Pintsopolous v. Harne In-
§16.2. 1339 Mass. 627, 162 N.E.2d 65 (1959). 
2279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932). 
§16.3. 1339 Mass. 600,161 N.E.2d 763 (1959). 
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sura nee CO.l that the defendant insurance company should not have a 
directed verdict on the evidence produced by the plaintiff, seeking to 
recover for damage to a bulldozer tractor that had been insured by the 
defendant against loss or damage from malicious mischief or vandalism. 
The tractor, purchased at an auction that was characterized by some 
animosity, had apparently operated satisfactorily during a twelve-day 
period. On the twelfth day the tractor broke down and a. mechanic 
drained roughly a quart of sand from the motor. The plaintiffs had 
the burden of proof of showing that the loss was caused by vandalism, 
i.e., "such wanton and malicious acts as are intended to damage or de-
stroy the property insured." 2 The evidence offered warranted the 
conclusion that there was greater probability that the sand was de-
liberately introduced through the oil intake than that it reached the 
motor by accidental or negligent means. 
§16.5. Policy conditions: Notice of accident. Lexington Insur-
ance Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.l was an action in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for a declaratory judg-
ment seeking construction of a policy of insurance, entered into in 
Massachusetts, that obligated the plaintiff insurer, a Delaware corpora-
tion, to indemnify the defendant railroad, a Virginia corporation, 
against liability for damage to freight cars and their contents caused 
by collision or derailment. Coverage afforded was $60,000, or 30 per 
cent of $200,000, in excess of a deductible amount of $100,000 for each 
loss. Printed policy provisions required of the insured a report as soon 
as practicable of every loss or damage that might become a claim, and 
the filing of a detailed sworn proof-of-loss within ninety days from the 
date of loss. A typewritten provision, apparently required by the in-
sured, recited that it was often difficult to determine immediately 
whether a loss exceeded the deductible amount and that the insured's 
interests would not be prejudiced by a failure to report any loss at the 
time of its occurrence. It further provided that the insurer waived the 
time limit for filing proofs of loss provided the insured used due dili-
gence to present proofs as soon after the occurrence as practicable. 
In construing the contract in question the governing rule is supplied 
by the laws of Massachusetts. In the absence of the specially added 
typewritten condition, the printed notice and proof-of-loss provision 
of the policy would have required a report of loss to the insurer 
or its agent "as soon as practicable," which the federal district court 
assumed would be, under Massachusetts law, a very short period of 
time. "Notice of an accident is required in order to give the insurer 
an opportunity to investigate the cause and nature of a claim while 
the facts are still fresh in the minds of the parties." 2 While, in the 
§16.4. 1 340 Mass. 734, 166 N.E.2d 559 (1960). 
2 Rich. v. United Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 328 Mass. 133, 134-135, 102 N.E.2d 
431,432 (1951). 
§16.5. 1 182 F. Supp. 523 (D. Mass. 1960). 
2 Segal v. Aetna Casualty &: Surety Co., 337 Mass. 185, 187-189, 148 N.E.2d 659, 
661 (1958), discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.6. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/19
§16.6 INSURANCE 179 
view of the Court, the special typewritten condition did not nullify the 
printed provision, the two had to be read together. When so read 
the insured was not excused from making a report, but need not report 
immediately when an accident occurred. The insured had a longer 
time than would have been reasonable under the printed provision 
standing alone, an understandable modification in the policy when 
considered in light of the detailed investigations customarily carried 
out by the railroad and the substantial deductible amount to which 
the coverage was subjected. Reports of six accidents given to the in-
surer within varying periods up to thirty days following the date of 
each accident were timely because given within a reasonable time after 
the railroad had an opportunity to check the details of losses and to 
consider whether they exceeded the deductible amount. 
§16.6. Policy conditions: Other insurance. In Maryland Casualty 
Co v. Hunter,! Maryland Casualty Company sought a determination as 
to whether a judgment obtained against its insured, and admittedly 
covered under a Massachusetts Garage Liability Policy issued by it, was 
also covered by a similar Massachusetts Garage Liability Policy issued 
by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. The judgment, in excess of 
$15,000, was obtained by McKay who was injured by an automobile 
owned by Bye, the operator of an automobile body business covered 
under the Aetna Policy, and driven by Fougere, the operator of an auto-
mobile service station covered under the Maryland policy. Repairer's 
plates had been issued to both Bye and Fougere by the Registry of 
Motor Vehicles. The only registration plates displayed on the auto-
mobile at the time of the accident were the repairer's plates of Fougere. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected Aetna's contention that the auto-
mobile was not a "motor vehicle . . . under a . . . dealer's or re-
pairer's registration" 2 and therefore not within the coverage of its 
policy, since at the time of the accident it was not operated under Bye's 
repairer plates. The statute permits a dealer or repairman, in lieu of 
registering each motor vehicle owned or controlled by him, to obtain 
a general distinguishing number and all motor vehicles owned or con-
trolled by him "shall be regarded as registered under the general dis-
tinguishing number or mark assigned to him . . . provided, that num-
ber plates, furnished as hereinafter provided, are properly displayed 
thereon." 3 The Court regarded the foregoing proviso as conditioning 
only the application of blanket registration and not the insurance cov-
erage required for such registration,4 and cited its earlier opinion in the 
Kenner case as decisive of this question: 
we think that the words . . . defining "motor vehicle" in "Cover-
age A" as a "motor vehicle . . . under a . . . dealer's or repair-
er's registration ... " mean a motor vehicle which the dealer or 
§16.6. 11960 Ma,ss. Adv. Sh. 949, 168 N.E.2d 271. . 
2 Cf. Insuring Agreement IV of Massachusetts Garage Liability Policy. 
3 G.L., c. 90, §5. 
4 Id. §34C. 
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repairer may by attaching his plates lawfully use on the public 
ways by virtue of his blanket registration' under c. 90, §5, whether 
or not his plates are actually upon it at the moment of any partic-
ular accident.1I 
The Court also rejected Maryland's contention that since both it 
and Aetna were liable, each was liable for $2500, or one·half the com-
pulsory insurance "per person" limit of $5000. The Maryland policy 
was written for compulsory limits only and Aetna had no liability 
under the excess limits provisions of its policy because of the insured's 
failure to give notice of the accident or notice of the claim or suit as 
required by the policy. Both policies contained the customary "other 
insurance" condition which provides that "if the insured has other 
insurance against a loss covered by this policy the company shall not 
be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the 
applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the 
total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance 
against such loss." 
Maryland argued that the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance 
La~ required a limit of liability for each person injured of $5000 and 
that this limit o~ coverage could not be increased by the availability 
to the insured of more than one policy. But, as the Court pointed out, 
the "other insurance" formula was specifically made applicable in 
each policy to the compulsory insurance, was not made inoperative if 
the other insurance was also compulsory insurance, and was neither 
prescribed by law nor forbidden by any statutory policy. In accord-
ance with its policy provisions, each insurer is required to share pro-
portionately the total loss, subject to the limitation that it will not 
be required to pay more than its applicable limit of liability. It seems 
unlikely that this result was intende~ either by the legislature or by the 
. the drafters of the insurance policy; it seems equally unlikely that situ-
ations of this kind would arise frequently enough to promote legisla-
tive correction. 
§16.7. Life insurance. Construction of policy. In the case of 
Aronson v. Suffolk Savings Bank,l a policy rider provided: "In the 
event the policy is not kept in force by payment of premiums, ... the 
provisions for family income benefit . . . become void. . .." The in-
sured died after the policy had lapsed fOr nonpayment of premiums, 
but during the period of extended term insurance effective under the 
terms of the nonforfeiture clause. It was held that the beneficiary 
could recover the face amount of the policy, but could not recover the 
family income benefit. 
Misrepresentations with intent to deceive. In Quintiliani v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CO.,2 on the issue of whether the de-
li Kenner v. Century Indemnity Co., 520 Mass. 6, 11, 67 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1946). 
6 G.L., c. 90, §54A. 
§16.7. 1559 Mass. 648, 162 N.E.2d 44 (1959). 
2540 Mass. 95, 162 N .E.2d 852 (1959). 
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fendant had sustained its burden of showing that answers in the appli-
cation were false and made with actual intent to deceive, the Supreme 
Judicial Court sustained as unexceptionable a charge to the jury that 
it paraphrased as follows: "Were the answers false; should the appli-
cant have known that they were false; what was the applicant's actual 
intent in making them?" Further exceptions were dismissed as harm-
less in light of the charge. 
Construction of statute. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v'. Health, 
Welfare and Retirement Trust Funds Board,3 the petitioners con-
tended that the recently enacted Health, Welfare and Retirement 
Funds Act4 was not applicable to the "Pension Administration Funds" 
in question, and that they were, therefore, not required to register these 
employee benefit plans with the respondent board. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court sustained these contentions, stating that the. statute did 
not adequately show an intention to regulate plans that do not include 
the creation of a trust fund in the usual sense. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§16.8. Motor vehicle insurance. Early in 1953, after several 
months of intensive study and effort by a group of skilled technicians, 
the General Court enacted into law the Highway Safety Act.! This 
act created the Massachu~etts Highway Safety Committee,2 a "point 
system" to evaluate in terms of accident involvement and traffic law 
violations the operating records of motor vehicle registrants and others 
licensed to operate motor vehicles and, the continuing qualification of 
such persons to register and operate motor vehicles,3 and a plan for 
"merit rating" motor vehicle insurance on the basis of the operating 
point record of the risk insured.4 This legislation represented the 
fi~st completely integrated administrative program designed to con-
tribute to the solution of the closely related probletns of the state's 
disastrous highway accident record,5 the motor vehicle operator who 
should be denied the continued use of the public highways,6 and the 
insistent popular demand for an insurance rating system under which 
31960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 901, 167 N.E.2d 855, also noted in §14.4 supra. 
4 G.L., c. 15lD. 
§16.8. 1 G.L., c. 9OA, added by Acts of 1953, c. 570, effective June 30, 195~. 
2 G.L., c. 9OA, §§1-4. 
SId. §§5.10. 
4 Id: §§1l-17. 
I; The average private-passenger. car bodily.injury claim frequency for 1954·1956 
in Massachusetts was 6.4 per 100 cars insured, to be compared with New York with 
the next highest frequency of 4.8 and the national average of 2.8. See Senate Doc. 
No. 466, p. 45 Oanuary, 1959) report of the special commission under Resolves of 
1956, c. 125. 
II Twenty·four states have adopted point systems designed to achieve driver im-
provement and uniform treatment of driving license suspension or revocation. See 
Institute of Government of the University of North Carolina, Driver Improvement-
The Point System (1958). 
7
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the accident- and conviction-free-risk pays less than the risk with a 
record of accidents and convictions.7 
By its terms the merit rating provisions of the law did not become 
effective until January 1, 1956, at which time the premiums for motor 
vehicle liability policies became subject to surcharges on the basis of 
point accumulation records. Unhappily, it became quickly apparent 
that the legislature's insistence upon certain changes in the original 
bill, which had the effect of converting what was intended to be a 
system of premium-rate modifications, designed to measure comparative 
underwriting hazards, into a statewide, uniform level of surcharges 
to be treated as "penalties," coupled with the reluctance of the Regis-
try of Motor Vehicles to administer the law fully as written, served to 
promote public resistance to the program. Despite a demonstrably 
improved accident record following enactment of the law, the General 
Court hastily responded to the complaints of those subjected to pre-
mium surcharging and repealed the merit rating provisions less than 
six weeks after they became effective.s 
In the 1960 session of the General Court, the second major portion 
of the original enactment, namely, the "point system" provisions, were 
quietly repealed.9 The apparent reason for this repeal was the non-use 
of the statutory provisions requiring the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to 
establish and to administer a point system together with a schedule of 
penalties, including warnings to registrants and licensees, conferences 
with registrants and licensees, and suspensions and revocations of 
motor vehicle registrations and operators' licenses, all of which have 
been used effectively in other states to bring about a reduction in the 
highway accident toll. All that remains of the Massachusetts law are 
the sections creating one more highway safety committee, which has 
proven to be considerably less effective than most such committees. 
§16.9. Motor vehicle insurance: Tort actions. Motor vehicle tort 
actions for bodily injuries or for death may now be commenced within 
two years after the cause of action accrues, under the provision of Acts 
of 1960, c. 27l.1 Under the previous law the statute of limitations was 
one year, except when notice was given to the defendant by registered 
mail within one year, in which case a two-year period was allowed 
within which to bring the action. 
Acts of 1960, c. 303, amends the law2 permitting the transfer of motor 
7 In a rapidly increasing number of states (twenty-five states as of December 1. 
1960) so-called "merit rating" plans developed by the insurance companies have 
recently been approved for use. It is noteworthy that the current spread of merit 
rating plans is the latest of several such developments in the past twenty-five years. 
Historically merit rating "credits" are most welcome. merit rating "debits" are 
highly offensive. 
S Acts of 1956, c. 51, repealing §§12-15, 17, and amending §16. effective February 8, 
1956; Acts of 1956, c. 201, repealing §ll, effective March 15, 1956. 
9 Acts of 1960, c. 390, repealing §§5-lO, 16. 
§16.9. 1 Amending G.L.. c. 260, §4. 
21d., c. 231, §102C. added by Acts of 1958, c. 369, §3, discussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §18.1O. The 1960 amendment is also discussed in §22.5 infra. 
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vehicle tort actions by the Superior Court to the District Courts. An 
action so transferred under the section shall be considered as pending 
in the District Court and the parties shall be subject to the procedural 
rules of the District Court relative to interrogatories, specifications, 
amendments, and all other procedural matters regulating District 
Court cases. It is further provided by the amendments that the justice 
may order the action dismissed and judgment entered on the dismissal 
if both parties to the action fail to appear. Upon a request for re-
transfer to the Superior Court any original papers filed in the District 
Court after transfer of the case to the Superior Court shall be trans-
mitted to the clerk of the Superior Court. 
Provision is made under the Motor Vehicle Law for the suspension 
of any operator's license issued to a person against whom a judgment 
for property damage has been obtained, if such judgment remains un-
satisfied for a period of sixty days.s Acts of 1960, c. 327, amends this 
section to provide that if the judgment debtor satisfies the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment was obtained that he is unable to locate 
the judgment creditor or his legal representative, he may deposit with 
the clerk the full amount of the execution with interest, and the clerk's 
receipt, upon presentation to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, will be 
evidence of a complete discharge of the judgment debt. 
§16.10. Motor vehicle insurance: Cancellation. Under the Motor 
Vehicle Law the Registrar of Motor Vehicles is required to revoke the 
registration of a motor vehicle upon the cancellation of the liability 
policy or bond covering the motor vehicle. 1 Acts of 1960, c. 360,2 deals 
with the situation in which the insured registrant gives to a third 
party, usually a premium financing agency, a power of attorney that, 
among other things, authorizes the attorney to effect cancellation of the 
insurance required for registration. This new section specifies that 
no such power of attorney may be exercised until ten days notice by 
registered or certified mail is given to the policyholder and a statement, 
under the penalties of perjury, has been filed with the Registry of 
Motor Vehicles certifying that the notice has been given. The notice 
of cancellation to the insurance company must be accompanied by a 
statement of compliance with the new requirement, and the statute 
authorizes the insurance company to rely upon this statement. 
Upon the issuance by an insurance company of a notice of cancel-
lation of a motor vehicle liability policy or bond, the insured may 
file a written complaint with the Commissioner of Insurance, which 
will be heard by the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Poli-
cies and Bonds.s Acts of 1960, c. 264,4 provides that if the cancellation 
complaint is withdrawn on or subsequent to the cancellation date 
shown in the insurer's notice of cancellation, the Board of Appeal 
S G.L., c. 90, §22A. 
§16.IO. 1 G.L., c. 90, §34K. 
2 Adding new Section 34J to G.L., c. 90. 
S G.L., c. 175, §113D. 
4 Amending G.L., c. 175, §113D. 
9
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shall dismiss the complaint and fix the effective date of cancellation 
as of a date ten days after filing the memorandum of the finding and 
order with the Commissioner of Insurance. 
Upon the cessation of the authority of an insurer to issue motor 
vehicle liability policies or bonds, the Commissioner of Insurance 
must give notice of the cessation of authority to the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles.1i The registrar is required by the Motor Vehicle Law to send 
notice to each insured of the unauthorized company that his registra-
tion will be revoked unless he provides the registrar with a new cer-
tificate of insurance within five days. Presumably for administrative 
convenience, Acts of 1960, c. 332,6 amends this requirement to provide 
that the notice of revocation must be issued by the registrar but only 
upon the written request of the Commissioner of Insurance. 
§16.11. Accident and health insurance. Many policies of accident 
and health insurance have in recent years excluded coverage for dis-
ability treated in a hospital operated by the Veteran's Administration 
or by the United States or any governmental unit when a patient other-
wise entitled to services without charge is nevertheless charged for these 
services when insurance is known to be available. In effect, this prac-
tice SUbjects the buyer of insurance to an additional levy for the benefit 
of the tax-supported institutions. Acts of 1960, c. 339,1 now makes 
void any such policy provision that excludes liability for hospital, 
medical, or surgical expenses if the insured is hospitalized in a soldier's 
home established by the Commonwealth. 
§16.12. Group insurance: Dividends and premium refunds. A 
new provision was added to the labor law by Acts of 1959, c. 552,1 
regulating the disposition of dividends declared or rate reductions 
made under policies of group insurance. Customarily these policies 
have provided that any excess of dividends or premium refunds over 
the premiums paid by the policyholder would be applied for the benefit 
of the group of insured persons. Under the terms of the new statutory 
provision, the excess of the aggregate dividends or rate reductions 
under all group insurance policies issued to the policyholder over the 
aggregate payments for all such policies, including the costs of admin-
istration of the policies, made by the policyholder from funds con-
tributed by the policyholder, the employer of the insured persons, or 
a union to which the insured persons belong, shall be applied for the 
sole benefit of the insured persons. 
§16.13. Group insurance: Public employees. Acts of 1959, c. 426, 
amended the definition of dependents1 under the Group Insurance 
Plan for Employees of the Commonwealth to include any child nine-
I! Id. §llllC, requiring notification to the registrar "of the names of all companies 
as they become or cease to be authorized to issue motor vehicle liability policies .•. " 
6 Amending G.L., c. 90, §1I4H; 
§16.1I. 1 Amending G.L., c. 175, §22. 
§16.12. 1 Adding a new §178E to G.L., c. 149. 
§16.11l. 1 G.L., c. 1I2A, §2(d). 
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teen years of age or over who is mentally or physically incapable of 
earning his own living. Acts of 1959, c. 516, further amended the defi-
nition to include an unmarried child nineteen years of age or over who 
is a full-time student in an educational or vocational institution and 
whose program of education has not been substantially interrupted 
by full-time gainful employment. The premium for the child in school 
must be paid in full by the employee. Acts of 1959, c. 4262 requires 
the Commonwealth to contribute 50 percent of the additional premium 
for the incapacitated child. Corresponding changes were made in the 
Group Insurance Plan for Employees of Counties, Cities, Towns and 
Districts by Acts of 1960, c. 214.3 
The state employees group insurance plan was further extended, 
effective January, 1961, by Acts of 1960, c. 389,4 to make available on 
an optional basis group life insurance and group accidental death and 
dismemberment insurance above the $2000 coverage required to be 
provided. The additional amounts of insurance available are based 
upon the employee's gross salary and must be paid for by the employee 
without any premium contribution by the Commonwealth. 
Under the provisions of Acts of 1960, c. 505,5 50 percent of the group 
life coverage, not including the optional additional coverage, and the 
group hospital, surgical, and medical benefits will be continued for 
retired employees of the Commonwealth, who are required to pay 
therefor 50 percent of the average group premium with the balance 
of the premium to be paid by the Commonwealth. These amended 
provisions apply retroactively to persons with retirement dates on or 
after January 1, 1956, who were insured under the plan. Provision 
for the payment of 50 percent of the premium required for the con-
tinuation of coverage on a retired employee of a county, city, town, 
or district is now permitted under Acts of 1959, c. 595,6 when properly 
authorized by vote of the county commissioners, city council, town 
election, or district meeting. 
Acts of 1960, c. 386, amends the Group Insurance Plan for Employees 
of the Commonwealth7 and the Group Insurance Plan for Employees 
of Counties, Cities, Towns and Districts8 to permit continuation of 
the group hospital, surgical, and medical benefits by the surviving 
spouse of a deceased retired employee until the remarriage or death 
of the surviving spouse. The amount and method of payment of the 
premium will be determined by the state employees' group insurance 
commission or by the appropriate public authority, with the entire 
cost to be borne by the surviving spouse. 
Heretofore the schedule of group hospital, surgical, and medical 
2 Amending G.L., c. 32A, §8(a). 
3 Amending G.L., c. 32B, §§2(b), 7(a). 
4 Amending G.L.,c. 32A, §§4-6, 10, and adding a new §1OA. 
5 Further amending G-L., c. 32A, §1O. 
6 Adding a new §9A to G.L., c. 32B. 
7 Adding a new §ll to G.L., c. 32A. 
8 Adding a new §9B to G.L., c. 32B. 
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benefits made available to employees of counties, cities, towns, and 
districts, and to the dependents of such employees, was established for 
each county by the county commissioners. Acts of 1960, c. 337,9 pro-
vides that the state employees' group insurance commission will pro-
mulgate a schedule of benefits, which is not to exceed the schedule of 
benefits for state employees, and which is to be the maximum schedule 
for employees of the counties, cities, towns, and districts of the Com-
monwealth. Benefits for these employees may be less than but may not 
exceed those provided in the schedule.lo To insure compliance with 
this requirement copies of group insurance contracts entered into by 
the appropriate public authority must be filed within thirty days for 
review by the commission and the insurer must within thirty days 
certify to the commission that the benefits afforded do not exceed the 
authorized benefit schedule.H 
§16.14. Insurance companies. Acts of 1960, c. 245, modifies the 
Administrative Procedure Actl to exempt from the hearing require-
ments of the act the revocation by the Commissioner of Insurance of 
the license of a foreign insurance company upon the ground of in-
solvency, capital stock or guaranty fund impairment, or contingent 
assets or surplus deficiency. 
Acts of 1960, c. 597, amends the statute2 regulating the negotiation 
by special insurance brokers of contracts of insurance with nonadmitted 
companies upon the filing with the Commissioner of Insurance of an 
affidavit that the required insurance cannot be procured from an ad-
mitted company. Under the amended statute this insurance may only 
be procured from a nonadmitted foreign company that has net cash 
assets of at least $300,000 and maintains with the proper officer of 
some other state a deposit of at least $400,000 held in trust for all of its 
policyholders in the United States and invested in securities permitted 
for insurance company investments in this Commonwealth. 
Recognizing the rapidly increasing use of electronic data processing 
equipment in the business of insurance, and the very substantial in-
vestments represented by this equipment, Acts of 1960, c. 447,3 au-
thorized the inclusion in the computation of the company's assets 
available for the payment of losses an electronic data processing ma-
chine, providing its cost is at least $100,000 and is amortized in full 
over a period of ten years or less. 
§16.15. Life insurance: Equity funding for pension plans. Acts of 
1960, c. 562, allows life insurance companies to write an entirely new 
form of annuity contract under certain circumstances and subject to 
certain limitations. Without going into specific detail, for which the 
9 Amending G.L.. c. 32B. §§2. 3. 5. 11. 14. 
10 Id. §11. 
11 Id. §3. 
§16.l4. 1 G.L.. c. 30A, §13. added by Acts of 1954. c. 681, §l. 
2 G.L .• c. 175. §168. 
3 Amending G.L., c. 175. §ll. 
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reader is referred to the statute, the new section l allows life companies 
to sell annuity policies as to which a certain portion of the premium 
is invested to produce future retirement benefits guaranteed as to 
amount and duration (the standard annuity) and a certain portion is 
invested with a view to producing future retirement benefits, the 
amount of which will vary depending upon investment success (the 
so-called "variable annuity"). To accomplish the desired purpose, the 
statute authorizes life companies to assign the premium receipts to a 
separate investment account, which is not subject to the investment 
restrictions imposed by G.L., c. 175, §63. The major result of this 
authorization is to enable investment of some portion of the account 
in common stocks. 
This statute is of major significance. As finally enacted, it represents 
a compromise between proponents of the straight "variable annuity" 
(in which the benefits to the annuitant vary directly with the market 
value of the separate investment account) and those who favored the 
traditional annuity (in which the benefits to the annuitant are guaran-
teed). It may be anticipated that substantial portions of such in-
vestment accounts will be invested in common stocks, a procedure 
that would have produced highly successful results over any twenty-
five year period in the past fifty years. If history repeats itself, this 
statute may enable sale of group annuity contracts that (I) produce 
more income to the annuitant on retirement, (2) cost less to obtain 
the same coverage, or (3) combine both advantages to some extent. 
The statute is broad enough to encompass many variations of plans. 
Passage of this statute does not, however, mean that contracts based 
on it may be purchased immediately. The Internal Revenue Service, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and various local regulatory 
bodies must also pass upon certain aspects of these policies before life 
insurance companies can market them. Close attention to future de-
velopments is in order for all interested in such a plan. 
§16.16. Life insurance companies: Loans on real estate. Acts of 
1960, c. 294, amends G.L., c. 175, §63(7), to allow domestic life in-
surance companies to grant loans up to 75 percent, rather than 66i 
percent, of the fair market value of real property or leasehold estates. 
The section is otherwise unchanged. 
§16.l5. 1 G.L.. c. 175. §132F. 
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